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LABOR LAW RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE To SuE ON Coq,ECTIVE BARGAINING CoNTRACT BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND UNION Defendant, a theatre

owner, in March, I939, entered into a collective bargaining contract with a
local union by the terms of which he agreed to hire only union operators, to pay

1942}
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them a specified wage, and to give them two weeks' notice of their discharge, or
two weeks' salary in lieu thereof, should he decide to go out of business. Plaintiff,
a union member, was employed by the defendant from March, 1939, until he
was discharged in December, 1939. It appeared that this discharge was occasioned by defendant's sale of his theatre and retirement from the business.
Plaintiff sued for breach of the contract between defendant and the union, and
claimed as damages his wages from December, 1939, until the commencement
of this suit. Held, recovery denied, since the collective bargaining contract between the employer and the union could not be enforced against the employer
by an individual employee. Swart v. Huston, (Kan. 1941) l 17 P. (2d) 576.1
This decision is in conformity with the rule followed in some states that the
collective bargaining agreement gives no right of action to an individual employee.2 However, so many qualifications have been engrafted upon this "rule"
that there remain comparatively few cases to which it will apply. A number of
theories have been evolved to secure to the employee the benefits of the union's
agreement with his employer.3 Even those courts which say that the collective
agreement cannot be enforced by the employee, since it creates no contractual
relation between him and his employer, have treated such agreements as creating
usages or customs which become incorporated into and are binding terms of the
individual employee's contract. 4 This indirect enforcement is designated as the
"usage" theory, and has a limited application. 5 A second theory advanced by
1

The same result was reached in a recent case by the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court in Rotnofsky v. Capitol Distributors Corp., 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 563
(1941). One judge, in dissent, expressed his regret that the case had been argued on
an agency theory and argued that the employee was entitled to recover as a third-party
beneficiary of the collective agreement.
2
Jones v. Hearst Consolidated Publications, 190 Ga. 762, IO S. E. (2d) 761
(1940); Panhandle & S. F. Ry. v. Wilson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d)
216; Young v. Canadian Northern Ry., [1931] A. C. 83; Kessell v. Great Northern
Ry., (D. C. Wash. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 304; West v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 103 W. Va.
417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927); Hudson v. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. Pac. Ry., 152 Ky. 7II,
154 S. W. 47 (1913); Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136
(1904).
3
This discussion is limited in scope to the rights of the employee against his
employer based on the collective agreement. For a discussion of other aspects of the
enforcement of the collective agreement, see generally, Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law," 44 HARV. L. REv. 572 (1931); Fuchs, "Collective Labor
Agreements in American Law," IO ST. Loms L. REv. I (1925); Witmer, "Collective
Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. 195 (1938); and 95 A. L. R. IO
(1935).
4
Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 Ark. 197, 224 S. W. 436 (1920);
Piercy v. Louisville & N. R.R., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923); Hall v. St.
Louis-S. F. Ry., 224 Mo. App. 431, 28 S. W. (2d) 687 (1930); Hudson v. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. Pac. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47 (1913). Rentschler v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934), is said to be a valid precedent
for allowing the employee rights on either the usage theory or the third-party beneficiary theory in 13 NEB. L. BuLL. 317 at 319 (1935).
5
For example, recovery has been denied to an employee who did not know of the
collective agreement. Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. ( 2d)
692 (1928). When the usage is expressly rejected, as in Langmade v. Olean Brewing
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the cases treats .the union as the agent for the employee in negotiating the collective agreement, the terms of which control his individual employment contract, 6 although this rationale has been criticized as defective. 1 A third approach
is to look upon the employee as a third-party beneficiary of the collective agreement with a corresponding right of enforcement against his employer. 8 This
theory likewise is not without its conceptual flaws. 9 Thus, it would seem that no
one of these theories can be applied to all the situations which have arisen, even
if the validity of that theory be admitted. Perhaps, as one writer has suggested,1°
these collective agreements should be put in a new legal category, since they do
not fit into existing conceptions of mere contract or of mere customs, or even the
two combined. Such a rational approach would permit the courts to deal more
effectively with each case on its own factual problems, without the necessity of
classifying the relationship between the parties or of characterizing the nature of
the agreement. 11 The court in the principal case conceded that there was merit
in the third-party beneficiary concept, but balked because t~e terms of this colCo., 137 App. Div. 355, 121 N. Y. S. 388 (1910), the collective agreement does not
control the terms of the individual employee's contract. A suggested distinction was
made in Byrd v. Beall, 150 Ala. 122, 43 So. 749 (1907), between a "custom" and a
"usage" regarding the requirement of knowledge on the part of the employee. See
Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law," 44 HARV. L. REV. 572 at 583
(1931), where Byrd v. Beall, supra, which did not involve a collective labor agreement,
is discussed.
6
Barnes & Co. v. Berry, (C. C. A. 6th, 1909) 169 F. 225; Maisel v. Sigman,
123 Misc. 714, 205 N. Y. S. 807 (1924). See West v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 103
W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927), and Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry., 37 Ga. App.
744, 141 S. E. 819 (1928).
.
1 In Hamilton, "Individual Rights Arising From Collective Labor Contracts," 3
Mo. L. REV. 252 at 256 (1938), the author suggests these defects, inter alia, of the
agency rationale. ( 1) The union, unlike the ordinary agent, is bound by the contract.
( 2) An employee can take advantage of a contract executed prior to his employment.
(3) Non-union workers may recover under the collective agreement. (4) An employee
may recover even though he has no knowledge of the existence of the collective contract.
8
Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. S. 952 (1914); Blum & Co.
v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, I 53 N. E. l 54 (1926); and see, Yazoo & M. V. R. R.
v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931), where a non-union member was allowed recovery on a third-party beneficiary theory.
9
For example, at the outset there may be difficulty in finding a contract benveen
the union and the employer, although the elements of legal consideration can usually
be spelled out. Likewise, the theory would not cover the employee's liability to the
employer, since in the usual case there are no obligations imposed on the third-party
beneficiary. Nor would the theory take care of a suit by the union against the employer
where the agreement was made by the union on the one hand and an employer's
association on the other. See Hamilton, "Individual Rights Arising From Collective
Labor Contracts," 3 Mo. L. REV. 252 at 255 (1938).
10
Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law," 44 HARV. L. REv.
572 at 606 (1931).
11
Witmer, "Collective Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. 195 (1938).
See also Lenhoff, "The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal
System," 39 Mica. L. REv. 1109 at II33 ff. (1941).
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lective agreement could not be applied to strict contract dogma.12 Although the
categorical and formalistic approach might reach the proper result in a given
case, a more flexible and realistic attitude is to be desired.

David Davidoff

12 "Nothing is more common than enforceable contracts made for the benefit of a
third party, and it would appear to be quite feasible for the collective bargain between a
labor union and an employer to include details defining the mutual or reciprocal obligations of the employee and employer toward each other, with some provision to show
that the employee had agreed to be personally bound by its terms .... Nothing of that
kind is involved in the collective bargain .•. in this action." Principal case, I 17 P.
(2d) 576 at 579, 580.

